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## DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 September 1983

## India-Pakistan: Current Relations and Security Concerns

Relations between India and Pakistan have improved somewhat over the past year, in our view. The two countries are attempting to settle a variety of nonpolitical issues through their recently established Joint Commission. Progress on political talks, however, has stalled over substantive disagreements on the nature of their relationship

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- New Delhi wants Islamabad to affirm India's view that the two countries would be limited to the bilateral settlement of disputes unless both sides agreed to outside mediation.
- India requires that both sides abide by a definition of nonalignment that specifically forbids either state the right to grant military bases to a third power or enter into a foreign alliance.
- In our view, India wants a permanent shelving of the Kashmir dispute and Pakistani recognition of the current ceasefire line as an international boundary.

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Both India and Pakistan view the other as its primary enemy and their improved relationship remains tenuous and could easily be disrupted.

- Pakistan believes India has never accepted its independent existence and it wants to make it a weak buffer state under Indian hegemony. Islamabad is particularly

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concerned that India and the Soviets will cooperate to impose their demands on Pakistan.

-- India views Pakistan's strong ties with China with alarm and charges that Pakistan is using the Afghanistan crisis to strengthen itself against India. It opposes US weapons assistance to Pakistan and wants to maintain the Indian Ocean area free of superpower rivalry. [redacted]

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Both countries have the bulk of their armed forces deployed along their common border. India's forces opposite Pakistan are larger and better equipped than those of Pakistan. Even with Pakistan's current arms modernization, we estimate that India's military superiority over Pakistan will continue to grow through the 1980s. (See attached graphics) [redacted]

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Pakistan has little strategic depth opposite India. Most of its principal cities and major lines of communications are within 100 kilometers of the Indian border. A major breakthrough by Indian forces would immediately threaten Pakistan's most important political, cultural, and economic assets.

Consequently, Pakistan's military strategy emphasizes a forward defense against India.

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-- Pakistan's armed forces have serious command-and-control, training, and logistic deficiencies, according to our analysis, which limit their effectiveness, even with the acquisition of new weapons.

-- Pakistan has more strategic depth in the west and has adopted a strategy of defense-in-depth opposite Afghanistan. The deployment of only four divisions in the west supports this strategy; Pakistan would have time to move reinforcements from east to west before Afghan or Soviet forces could threaten vital Pakistani assets. [redacted]

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
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## Current and Projected Indian and Pakistani Force Levels


Note change in scale

India  
 Pakistan


### Combat Aircraft<sup>a</sup>




### Tanks<sup>b</sup>



### Warships



### Combat Maneuver Brigades



<sup>a</sup>Excludes combat-capable trainers or aircraft in reserve storage.

<sup>b</sup>Excludes tanks in storage.

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## Afghanistan: Status and Prospects of the Insurgency

Three and a half years after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the resistance has become an effective force that controls much of the country [redacted]

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Barring a drastic change in Soviet policy, we judge the fighting will continue over the next few years because existing Soviet forces will be unable to destroy the resistance. Despite improvements in weapons and training, however, we believe the insurgents will lack the firepower and organization to defeat major Soviet units. [redacted]

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The Soviets are becoming more concerned about their difficulties in coping with the resistance [redacted].

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-- Large-scale Soviet and Afghan operations this spring and early summer failed to weaken the resistance and the Afghan Government still controls only about 30 percent of the country; the same amount it controlled in July 1982.

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-- The insurgents have expanded the war with attacks in and around major cities, especially Kabul. The Soviets are apprehensive over increasing guerrilla activity in western Afghanistan and infiltration from Iran.

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-- The Soviets have failed so far to rebuild the Afghan Army into a force capable of effectively fighting the insurgents. [redacted]

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Soviet costs in the war have been considerable, according to our estimates [redacted]

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-- We estimate that over 16,000 Soviets have been killed or wounded in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered 50,000 casualties and nearly 80,000 men have deserted.

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- The insurgents have shot down or destroyed in attacks on airfields some 350 Soviet and Afghan aircraft (mostly helicopters) and nearly 150 more have been lost in accidents.
- Approximately 10,000 Soviet and Afghan armored vehicles and trucks have been destroyed or damaged.
- Direct Soviet costs in Afghanistan probably total around 12 billion dollars since the invasion.

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Nevertheless, we judge the Soviets still find the costs bearable and apparently believe that their relations with many countries are recovering from the damage done by the invasion and that in the long run they will overcome the resistance. We believe there is no immediate prospect that the Soviets will decide to reduce their military effort in Afghanistan.

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We judge that the resistance fighters will become more politically sophisticated and militarily effective in the next two years, but they will remain vulnerable.

- The most serious threat to the resistance is civilian weariness and the loss of popular support over the long term that would directly affect the will to continue fighting.
- Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but because of deep ideological, political, and religious differences, we do not foresee a united resistance movement emerging in the next few years.
- The Soviets and the Kabul regime are likely, in our view, to continue and probably increase a wide variety of covert and overt activities--such as arranging truces, encouraging defections, and subverting groups--to exploit insurgent weaknesses inside and outside of Afghanistan.

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There are some Soviet options--massive troop reinforcement or a widespread scorched earth policy against civilians--that might drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years.

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- Moscow would, however, be reluctant to assume the high economic, political, and military costs associated with these options, in our judgment.

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The Soviets have started a number of economic, educational, social, and political programs in Afghanistan that they believe will eventually turn the country into a viable Soviet-dominated communist state. Because of widespread insurgent activity and opposition from the Afghan people, however, these programs have been implemented in only a few areas.

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## DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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## Pakistan: Steadfastness on Afghanistan

Pakistani leaders view the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a strategic threat. They believe [redacted] the Soviets want to gain permanent overland access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean littoral. They are worried that Moscow will increase its political and military pressure on Pakistan once it has consolidated its hold on Afghanistan. [redacted] [redacted] they are concerned that Moscow will collaborate with India to neutralize and divide Pakistan--perhaps by a combination of external military pressure and subversive meddling in Pakistan's unstable domestic politics. [redacted]

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We believe Pakistan continues to engage the Soviets in periodic talks on Afghanistan for a number of reasons:

- The UN-sponsored talks provide Pakistan both with a way to test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain international support for its position on Afghanistan.
- Pakistan keeps its channels open to Moscow because it worries that the West will in time forget about Afghanistan or reach an agreement over Pakistan's head as part of a larger East-West settlement.
- The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and concern in the Army that some 3 million Afghan refugees will become a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a note of urgency to Pakistan's search for a political settlement. So far, however, relations between the Afghan refugees and locals--who belong to the same ethnic group--have been peaceful. [redacted]

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We doubt Islamabad is ready to shift its stand on the issue in ways that would damage US interests. So far in the indirect talks at Geneva, Pakistan has remained steadfast in its insistence that a political settlement is contingent on a withdrawal of Soviet troops. According to [redacted] statements by senior Pakistani officials:

[redacted]

- Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make it more difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan. An active insurgency is crucial to Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan before world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
- A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Islamabad knows the refugees will not return home unless the Soviets first withdraw their troops.
- Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the Babrak regime. Islamabad knows that recognition is its trump card. It is doubtful that it would play it until a pull-out of Soviet troops is largely completed and most of the refugees have returned home.
- Pakistan's current policy on Afghanistan receives strong support from conservative religious parties at home and vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the US. Pakistan's strong stand on Afghanistan and its support for an active insurgency enables it to argue more effectively with the Saudis, the US, and China that it needs and deserves enhanced diplomatic, economic, and military support. [redacted]

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## Pakistan: Implications of Military Commitments to Arab States

Pakistan's approximately 18,000 military personnel stationed in the Middle East and North Africa are becoming an important vehicle for achievement of Islamabad's foreign policy goals. Pakistan has reaped significant benefits from the program, according to our analysis:

- Salary remittances have provided an economic boost.
- Islamabad has acquired new sources of arms procurement.
- Pakistan has become one of the largest non-Arab recipients of financial support from the oil-rich Arab states.
- Pakistan's military personnel have gained valuable training on advanced Western and Soviet military equipment--including Soviet aircraft--which has given them a better understanding of the capabilities of the Indian Air Force. [redacted]

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We believe the military assistance, however, also carries risks:

- The longer the Pakistani troops stay abroad, the greater the risk that Pakistan will become embroiled in local or regional conflicts to which it is not a party.
- Pakistan's international image is tarnished by charges that it provides "soldiers for hire" to radical regimes such as Libya.
- [redacted] morale within the armed forces could be damaged by the disparity between overseas and domestic salaries and by discrimination against Pakistani [redacted] [redacted]

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We judge Pakistan will continue and may even expand its military ties with the Middle East in order to ensure Arab political support and economic assistance. In our view, as long as Pakistani personnel demonstrate competence and Pakistan maintains a stable and moderate government with Islamic credentials, there will be a market for its military personnel in the Middle East and North Africa. We believe that concern over external and internal threats to stability brought on by the strife in Lebanon, the continuing Iran/Iraq conflict, and Iran's Shia religious fanaticism might well prompt the Gulf states to request even larger foreign military contingents.

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Our analysis suggests, however, that several factors could slow an expansion of military ties or lead to a reduction in requests for military assistance:

- The limited capacity of the recipient countries to absorb more military personnel.
- Competition from other states to supply military advisers.
- The risk that Pakistan could be drawn into regional conflicts.
- The limited number of skilled technical personnel in Pakistan.

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The United States generally benefits from Pakistan's military assistance program. Cooperation between Islamabad and the Arab States strengthens the military establishments of moderate governments while dampening Pakistan's financial demands on the United States and minimizing the US visibility in this sensitive region. Only in the training of Libyan pilots and small numbers of Palestinian guerrillas do Pakistan's military ties run counter to US interests. We assess that a setback to the military assistance program, accompanied by a reduction in Arab economic assistance to Pakistan, would increase political and economic strains in Pakistan and increase Islamabad's requests for US economic and military aid.

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